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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOHNN. BACH, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, Supreme Court No. 31716 
v. 
~ILED-COP, 
AL VA A. HARRIS, et al., MAY 28 3111B 
Defendants / Appellants. I Supreme c,urt---~9urt of Appeals-
Entered on ATS by: -
APPELLANTS'BRIEF 
' 
Appealed from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Teton County 
Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District Judge 
Appellant and Attorney for Appellants 
Alva A. Harris, Esq. 
POBox479 
Shelley, Idaho 83274 
For Respondent 
John N. Bach, Pro Se 
PO Box 101 
Driggs ID 83422 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises as a result of a lawsuit filed by Plaintiff John N. Bach against numerous 
Defendants alleging a laundry list ofallegations against numerous Defendants. An initial Complaint 
alleged that there was damaged property, racketeering and al.legations of threats of batteries. The 
Amended Complaint contained the allegations and sougbt damages in excess of one million dollars 
and sougbt punitive damages in excess of five million dollars. Appellants filed a Notice of 
Appearance and a Motion to Dismiss. While the Motion to Dismiss was pending, the Court Clerk 
entered a Default against Appellants. Aferthe Motion to Dismiss was denied, without any additional 
notice, Plaintiff submitted an Application For EntryOfDefanltpursuant to IRCP 55( a) which default 
was entered by the Court Clerk. Without having received notice of the application for default, and 
approximately four hours after the default had been entered by the Court, the Appellants filed their 
Answer in this matter. Appellants thereafter moved to set aside the default which the Trial Court 
denied. Thereafter the Trial Court entered Judgment against the defaulted Defendants. From these 
orders, Appellants Appeal. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On Inly 23, 2002, Plaintiff filed his Complaint seeking among other things damage to his 
property and person and alleging allegations of racketeering and seeking an injunction and damages 
in excess of a million dollars and punitive damages in excess of five million dollars. See Clerk's 
Record (hereinafter "R"), Vol. 1, p. 1. The Appellants Alva Harris on his ovm behalf, and on behalf 
of Defendants Bob Fitzgerald, Ole Oleson, and Blake Lyle submitted a Notice of Appearance on 
August 5, 2008. See R., Vol. 1, p. 16. The Trial Court ordered Plaintiff to file an Amended 
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Complaintthat properly set forth the allegations. See R, Vol. 1, p. 45. Therefater, on September 27, 
2002 Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. On November 8, 2002, Appellants filed a Motion 
to Dismiss asking the Comt to strike the First Amended Complaint and consolidate this case with 
another Teton County Case. 
On January 22, 2003, Appellants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(8) 
requesting the Court to dismiss the pleadings because of a pending case in the Federal Court (CV-
01-266-E-TGN). The Clerk of the Court entered aDefanlt against the Appellants on January 27, 
2003. See R, Vol 3, p. 446. On March 4, 2003, the Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismiss in its 
Eighth Order on Pending Motions. See R, Vol. 2, p. 246, at 256. Thereafter on March 19, 2003, 
Appellants filed an Answer and Demand for Jury Trial. See R, Vol. 2, p. 317, at 319. The Answer 
asserted defenses of statute oflimitatious, failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may 
be granted, that the Plaintiff was more responsible for his comparative negligence than were 
Defendants, that any alleged damages were a result of third parties, that the defendant is barred by 
the doctrines res judicata, judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, waiver, failure to exhaust judicial 
remedies, doctrine of qualified immunity, unclean hands, misrepresentation, and requested a jury 
trial. 
On March 19, 2003, the same day Appellants filed their Answer, but apparently earlier that 
day, the Plaintiff submitted a Clerk's Default and Affidavit, Application of Default which Clerk's 
Default was entered by the Clerk. SeeR, Vol. 2, p. 320-322. Appellants timely filed a Motion to 
Set Aside Default. See R, Vol. 2, p. 324. Thereafter, Appellants filed a Notice of Hearing on the 
Motion to Set Aside Default and to reinstate the Answer and supported it with an Affidavit. See R, 
Vol. 4, p. 540A-E. The Trial Court denied the Motion to Set Aside and entered Default Judgment 
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against the Appellants following an evidentiary hearing. See R Vol. 7, p. 1101, Vol. 8, p. 1367. 
The Trial Court thereafter entered a Final Judgment. SeeR, Vol. 9, p. 1505. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the Court err as a matter of law in allowing the Clerk's Default to be entered 
when a prior default had already been entered and an Answer filed? 
2. Did the Court err in exercising its discretion when it refused to set aside the Clerk's 
Default? 
3. Did the Court err when it imposed a monetary Judgment that was based on 
speculation? 
ill. ARGUMENT 
Appellants assert that the Trial Court erred in having a default entered and failing to set aside 
the default and subsequently for entering a default judgment. 
A. CLERK'S DEFAULT 
IRCP 12( a) provides that a Defendant shall have twenty (20) days after service of Summons 
and Complaint to file an answer or other permitted motion. fu the event the Court denies the motion, 
the responsive pleading shall be served withing ten (10) days after notice of the court's action. In 
this case, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appearance and multiple motions, including a Motion to 
Dismiss. The Trial Court Clerk entered a default in this matter on January 27, 2003, even though a 
pending Motion to Dismiss was filed. Thereafter, that default was not set aside until the Trial Court's 
order on June 2, 2003 (See R Vol. 4, p. 563), approximately two and a half months after an Answer 
had been filed. 
IRCP Rule 55(a)(l) stated in 2003 as follows: 
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When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the 
court, or the clerk thereof, shall enter default against the party. 
In 2004, the rule was amended to clarify that the Court was to enter an Order ordering the default 
and also requiring a 3-d.ay written notice of the application of any default, effectively making as a 
rule what had been the practice. 
JRCP 55(a)(l)(as amended in 2004) provides as follows: 
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the 
court, shall order entry of default against the party. Default shall not 
be entered against a party who has appeared in the action unless that 
party ( or, if appearing by representative, the party's representative) 
has been served with three (3) days 'Nritten notice of the application 
for entry of such default. 
In this matter, it is clear that although the Appellants had appeared in the case and filed multiple 
motions, that no notice was given to Appellants of any intended default. The Affidavit submitted 
by Plaintiff in connection with his default does not state or attest that any notice was given to the 
Appellants of the intended default. The Trial Court's refusal to vacate the entry of default should be 
reversed. 
This Court has clearly stated the policy that defaults are not favored and should be set aside 
in doubtful cases. See Suitts v. Nicks, 141 Idaho 706, 708 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005) ("Because 
judgments by default are not favored, a trial court should grant relief in doubtful cases in order to 
decide a case on the merits.);Jobnson v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727, 732, 662 
P.2d 1171, 1176 (1993) ("Judgments by default are not favored, and the general rule in doubtful 
cases is to grant relief from the judgment in order to reach a judgment on the merits.") This Court 
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has set forth the overriding oilier policy that "[p ]rocedural rules, other than those which are 
jurisdictional, should be applied to promote the disposition of causes upon their merits."Id. 
Furthermore, this Court stated "Irr determining whether to set aside a default judgment, we must 
apply a standard of liberality rafuer than strictness and give the party moving to vacate the default 
the benefit of a genuine doubt." Id. at 733, 662 P .2d at 1177. 
It should be noted that at the time Appellants petitioned the Court to set aside the default, 
fuere had been no judgment entered. Tue Idaho Court of Appeal's decision in McFarland v. Curtis, 
123 Idaho 931, 854 P.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1993), noted that the burden to set aside a default is less 
stringent then the Rule 60(b) standard to set aside a default judgment. Id. at 936,854 P.2d at 279. 
Defaults are to be set aside if god cause is shown. See IRCP 55(c). Appellants assert that good 
cause existed to set aside the default. Appellants submitted an Answer to this matter on the same 
day an Application for Default was filed. There was no notice of an intent to take default provided 
to Appellants. Appellants did not receive a copy of the Affidavit for Entry of Default until he 
received it in the mail on March 31, 2003. See R, Vol. 4, p. 540d. Plaintiff would not have ben 
prejudiced by the setting aside of a default. In the present case, the Trial Court found no facts. 
Because no facts were found by the Trial Court, this Court is "at liberty to form our own impressions 
from the record and to exercise our own discretion in deciding whether the Default Judgment should 
have been set aside." Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727, 732, 662 P.2d 
1171, 1176 (1983). Appellants also plead facts that would constitute a defense to the suit. In the 
Answer filed by Appellants (See, R, Vol. 2, p. 317-319), the Appellants asserted defenses of statute 
oflimitatio:ns, comparative negligence, acts by third parties, doctrines res judicata.,judicial estoppel, 
collateral estoppel, waiver, failure to exhaust judicial remedies, doctrine of qualified immunity, 
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unclean hands, and misrepresentation. In Johnson, the Court analyzed whether sufficient facts had 
been plead which would constitute a defense. To determine the facts which had been plead to 
constitute a defense, the Johnson Court reviewed the answer and analyzed the defenses asserted. Id. 
at 733. 662 P.2d at 1177. The Court determined that the Answer could establish a defense and set 
aside the Default Judgment. Appellants herein assert that a meritorious defense has been shown 
here, and the default should be vacated. 
Appellants assert that the amount of damages simply was not proven in this matter to any 
degree ofcertainty. This Court has held that damages have to proven with reasonable certainty. This 
requires that they be taken out of the reahn of speculation. See Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 
Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007). In the present case, although there was a 
hearing set for the testimony on February 3, 2004, there was no meaningful substantive testimony 
given. Plaintiff rested on his exhibits. See Clerk's Transcript at p. 1461-1464. Appellants assert 
that the Affidavits did not contain sufficient facts to take the damages out of the realm of 
speculation. See Exhibits 81-1 to 81-6, 83-86. For example, Plaintiff wholly failed to establish 
ownership of the real property, which is a prerequisite for an award of damages for slander of title. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Appellants assert the Trial Court erred in not setting aside the default. As previously set 
forth, an Answer was filed within hours of when the Clerk's Default was entered. Because defaults 
are not favored and there is a public policy of getting to the merits of cases, the Trial Court should 
have set aside the default and allowed the pied defenses to be tried. Appellants assert that the Court 
erred as a matter oflaw when it vacated a default and imposed a subsequent default when an Answer 
had been filed. Additionallytbe Court abused its discretion in not allowing the default to be set aside 
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where good cause was shown as well as a meritorious defense. Further, the Court erred when it 
entered a Default Judgment where there was insufficient evidence presented to take the amount of 
damages out of the realm of speculation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of May, 2008. 
Alva Harris, Esq. 
Appellant and Attorney for Appellants 
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